profiling and terrorism
Apolitical statement #1: In any large, high-complexity search space where time and resources are limited, you’re just not going to cover the space without using heuristics to guide the search.
Apolitical statement #2: In a nutshell, the heuristic-based search for terrorists is (and was always going to be) problematic because:
- heuristics *always* miss
- heuristics that are good at hitting positives tend to be kind of shitty at missing negatives, and vice versa
- misses on positives (subject X was a terrorist that the search did not identify) and hits on negatives (subject X was misidentified as a terrorist) both really, really suck
There’s a rich an interesting philosophical/political debate to be had over whether we should, as a society, prefer to implement a search that fails in one direction or the other (failing to identify subjects who subsequently harm innocent people, or harming innocent people ourselves). But that’s not really what I came here to talk about.
I came to say that when we actually get more *information* about what heuristics are likely to work, and what heuristics are unlikely to work, we should (at least temporarily) set aside our positions in the philosophical/political debate to absorb findings that *could* advance the state of the search science.
Link: MI5 released some interesting study results the other day (via CryptoGram).

